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Rhetoric and the philosopher in Byzantium* 
STRATIS PAPAIOANNOU 
The scene is familiar. A Byzantine ‘sophist’ enters the stage. The ‘philoso-
phers’ are polite and graciously greet him, yet reject his company. In their 
eyes, he is not one of them. By contrast, the ‘sophists’ or, as the text also 
names them, the ‘rhetoro-sophists’ receive him with enthusiasm and grant 
him an honourable place among themselves. The (early?) twelfth-century 
author of the Timarion, to whom we owe this description,1 could not have 
imagined how his positioning of the Byzantine philosopher or, as he prefers 
to call him, ‘sophist’ would endure beyond the infernal stage of Hades, 
where Timarion’s oneiric experience takes place. Byzantine philosophers 
may still be valued today for their rhetoric and other technical skills (of, say, 
copying, collecting, or commenting upon philosophical texts), but rarely for 
their philosophy.2 
The author of the Timarion did not, of course, have the future of 
Byzantine philosophers in mind. What his sarcastic pen was aiming at was 
to disqualify the philosophical aspirations of self-professed philosophers of 
his immediate present. He did so by referring to an age-old anxiety of pre-
modern Greek writing dating back to, at least, the writings of Plato in 
fourth-century Athens. The anxiety pertained to the definition and regulation 
of the relation between discursive content and discursive form, between 
thought and language, or, as it came to be seen, between philosophy and 
rhetoric. The anxiety was provoked by the desire on the part of self-
proclaimed ‘philosophers’—such as Plato—to mark a distinct, privileged 
space for their own discursive production within the highly competitive field 
of public discourse in Athenian social life.3 
The negotiation between philosophy and rhetoric remained a constant 
point of reference for many generations of Greek writers. It was an opposi-
tion that would be used in order to separate different professions (βίοι) 
within the Roman-Greek Mediterranean world. Later, in Patristic writing, a 
                                                
* I would like to thank Katerina Ierodiakonou and Börje Bydén as well as Panagiotis 
Agapitos, Dimiter Angelov, John Haldon and Dominic O’Meara for several helpful sugges-
tions. 
1 Timarion (the relevant lines: 1123–35; see lines 1140–41 for the term ‘rhetoro-sophists’). 
2 For the historiography of Byzantine philosophy, see Trizio (2007). On Timarion, this 
Lucianic twelfth-century text, see Baldwin (1984); Tsolakes (1990); and, recently, Kaldellis 
(2007: 276–83). 
3 See McCoy (2007) with further bibliography.  
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similar polarity was employed to distinguish different world-views, namely 
orthodox Christian theology (imagined as true φιλοσοφία) from virtually 
every other discourse. Middle Byzantine intellectuals, the primary focus of 
this contribution, inherited this tradition and, as I wish to argue, came to re-
vive and transform several of its inflections, especially after the tenth cen-
tury. 
 
Timarion’s scene is a representative moment in the history of this revival 
and transformation and I would like to follow two of its leads. Firstly, the ill 
dreamer, whose prolonged nightmare includes the philosophical rejection 
and rhetorical embrace of the Byzantine philosopher, is concerned mainly 
with the position of the Byzantine intellectual within a set hierarchy. 
Timarion is not interested, that is, in the elaboration of the theoretical issue 
regarding the relation of content and form, thought and language. Rather, 
his concern regards status, authority, or what we might call social ‘subject-
position’, the place of the Byzantine intellectual within Byzantine high soci-
ety.4 
Secondly, the Byzantine philosopher whom Timarion satirizes is none 
other than Michael Psellos. This choice is not arbitrary. Among Byzantine 
intellectuals, Psellos was—perhaps more than anyone else—obsessed with 
presenting himself as a ‘philosopher’; indeed, he was the first in the history 
of Byzantium (as far as we can tell) to obtain an imperial confirmation of his 
philosophical profession by receiving the title ‘consul of philosophers’ 
(ὕπατος τῶν φιλοσόφων) during the innovative reign of Constantine IX 
Monomachos.5 More importantly, as has been already noted (though not 
adequately historicized), Psellos was equally obsessed with seeing himself 
as one who practiced an ideal mixture of philosophy and rhetoric.6 
Focusing on Michael Psellos along with one of his early Byzantine mod-
els and, then, several successors in the twelfth century, this paper will in-
vestigate how Byzantine philosophers portrayed themselves as philosophers 
in relation to rhetoric. My concern is thus what may be loosely termed phi-
losophical self-representation and it is only through this perspective that I 
                                                
4 For the term ‘subject-position’, see Whitmarsh (2001: 247; 295–301 and passim). 
5 Cf. Kazhdan & Wharton Epstein (1985: 123–27). No specific title for the head of a 
‘school [παιδοτριβεῖον] of philosophers’ is mentioned in the relevant source regarding an 
earlier similar appointment by Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos in tenth-century Constan-
tinople; cf. Theophanes Continuatus, Chronographia, ed. Bekker (1838: 446.1–22) (where 
also mention is made of three further ‘schools’ of rhetoric, geometry, and astronomy). 
6 Kustas (1973: 156–57); Anastasi (1974); Ljubarskij (2004: 197–224); Angold (1997: 76–
91); Kaldellis (1999: 127–54); Jenkins (2006: 145–51) and, recently, Kolovou (2010) are 
the most notable discussions. 
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will touch upon Byzantine conceptions of the philosophical issue regarding 
how rhetoric as form and profession relates to philosophy. This focus is not 
because Byzantine thinkers did not discuss the couplet rhetoric-philosophy 
as a theoretical issue per se—quite the contrary, Byzantine theorists often 
addressed this matter within the sophisticated theories on language and dis-
cursive aesthetics they developed. Yet, just like for the Socrates of the 
Platonic dialogues, for Roman and late antique Greek writers like Dionysius 
of Halicarnassus and Gregory of Nazianzus, the Byzantine theorists’ 
thinking was, before all else, framed by a desire to define the philosopher’s 
or the rhetor’s own image as a creator of authoritative speech. 
 
Synesius of Cyrene on the philosopher’s rhetoric 
As is the case with much else in Byzantium, so also Byzantine philosophers 
inherited their intellectual agendas from writers of the first glorious hundred 
years or so of Byzantine history. These early Byzantine writers were con-
sidered canonical reading material and their filtering of an entire earlier tra-
dition—from Plato to the Second Sophistic and Neoplatonism—defined the 
premises of later Byzantine writing.7 Of these authors, it is Synesius of 
Cyrene (c. 370–c. 413) that will serve as my example here. This choice is 
justified by a number of reasons. First, Synesius is one of the most self-
referential among early Byzantine writers, styling himself consistently as a 
‘philosopher’. Secondly, unlike, say, Themistius, Libanius, Julian or 
Proclus, Synesius was viewed in Byzantium as a Christian writer, despite 
the clearly Hellenic outlook he shared with these writers; he was thus 
regarded as being part of the interior Byzantine tradition.8 Thirdly, unlike 
other Christian writers who were equally self-referential, like e.g. Gregory 
of Nazianzus, Synesius summarized for Byzantine writers an emphatically 
Greco-Roman view of the definition of philosophy and rhetoric. His view, 
that is, was largely untouched by Christian preoccupations with theology 
and ascetic praxis. As an influential autobiographical writer, in appearance 
Christian but consciously Hellenic, Synesius can provide us an insight into 
the range of arguments that Byzantine writers had at their disposal as they 
set out to define their philosophical and rhetorical personae. 
                                                
7 On this adherence to early Byzantium, see Papaioannou (2008), where there is also further 
bibliography. 
8 See the entries in Photios, Bibliotheca 26.5b–6a, and the Suda, sigma.1511. Both Photios 
and the Suda, while acknowledging Synesius’ ‘Hellenism’, identify Synesius as a bishop 
and as a ‘philosopher’ and also praise his writing style. 
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Set in his own context, Synesius is a typical late antique intellectual. A 
Christian provincial aristocrat who became a bishop, Synesius traversed the 
socio-political distance separating his North African province from the new 
locus of power, Constantinople, as well as the intellectual space spanning 
from Greco-Roman structures of knowledge to the increasingly dominant 
Christian faith.9 In his various writings, Synesius emerges as a man attempt-
ing to retain for himself what he already possesses: a significant social 
standing and the consequent social authority that this standing could afford. 
In the late Roman Mediterranean world, such traditional aristocratic 
authority was not without challenges. It had to be re-affirmed, indeed pro-
claimed by the holder himself of social nobility, through acts and discourses 
of self-fashioning and in direct competition with a series of other emerging 
positions of authority (imperial, ecclesiastic, and, of course, ascetic). Facing 
this competition, the position that Synesius adopted through rhetorical self-
representation was to root his social status in a traditional intellectual iden-
tity, that of the Hellene ‘philosopher’. Though with a long history behind it, 
this self-identification was not an entirely easy task. Beyond the competi-
tion, claiming for oneself the profession of Hellenic philosophy was com-
plicated by the fact that the ‘Hellenic’ tradition itself offered Synesius 
somewhat fluid understandings—depending on context, genre, or audi-
ence—of what it meant to be a ‘philosopher’ as opposed to, say, a ‘sophist’ 
or a ‘rhetor’.10 Synesius, therefore, needed to revisit the definition of terms, 
delimit the boundaries of identities, and, in a sense, reinvent anew a phi-
losophical agenda. 
 
With this framework in mind, let us look at how Synesius goes about his 
self-fashioning. In public settings, Synesius distances himself entirely from 
rhetoric. In its sharpest, Platonic terms, the polarity is set in Synesius’ intro-
duction to his speech On Kingship, addressing the emperor Arcadius and his 
court.11 Let me paraphrase this lengthy prooemium. ‘I’, Synesius begins, 
have not come from a wealthy city, bringing arrogant and luxurious discourses, those 
vulgar [πάνδηµα] ones that rhetoric and poetry (vulgar [πάνδηµοι] arts themselves) 
                                                
9 For Synesius’ career set in its socio-historical context, see Cameron and Long (1993); 
Schmitt (2001); and Rapp (2005: 156–66). 
10 Cf. the pertinent remarks on the term ‘sophist’ in Whitmarsh (2005: 15–19). 
11 For the audience of this text, see Cameron and Long (1993: 134–42). The text is echoed 
in Psellos’ Chronographia; see Graffigna (2000). 
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produce.12 My recital will not induce pleasure [ἡδονή] aiming at immature listeners. 
My discourse is not of fluid ethos and stylized diction for the display of fake beauty. 
Rather, it is philosophy that has come to visit you with discourses of deep and divine 
manner, discourses that are masculine [ἀρρενωποί] and solemn. Indeed, free speech, 
the speech of philosophy, is the only one worthy of the king’s ear. Mere praise, by con-
trast, works like poison [φάρµακα] mixed with honey, incurring destruction. It is simi-
lar to cookery that incites fake desires and brings ruin, and entirely dissimilar to phi-
losophical discourse, which like gymnastics and medicine pains bodies while saving 
them. If you are strong enough (even though you are not thus accustomed) to bear the 
discourse of philosophy, the discourse of truth, then I, Synesius, have been set before 
you to proclaim it.  
There is nothing new in this claim against rhetoric placed strategically at the 
beginning of a rhetorical piece which among other things aims at establish-
ing its speaker, Synesius, as the authoritative voice of ‘philosophy’.13 
Philosophy and its practitioner are set in direct and, as it seems, non-
negotiable distance to rhetoric. 
In more private settings, such as the correspondence among friends of 
shared aspirations, however, Synesius can adopt a somewhat different 
stance. In the letter, for instance, that begins his letter-collection, Synesius 
argues that he ‘fathers’ discourses not simply of the ‘solemn’ philosophical 
kind, but also of the ‘vulgar’ (πάνδηµος, literally ‘belonging to the entire 
civic population’) rhetoric.14 Here, rhetoric, though still inferior to philoso-
phy, is integrated in the philosopher’s discursive production. 
This seemingly ambiguous stance is not surprising. From Plato onward 
ambiguity is a permanent feature of the philosophico-rhetorical debate. 
Synesius himself is among those writers that devoted careful thought on the 
unconditional distinction and, simultaneously, desirable combination of 
philosophy and rhetoric. This thought is recorded in Synesius’ Dion, a text 
that was a standard reading for the highly educated Byzantine élite.15 The 
                                                
12 An allusion to the negative connotation of the word πάνδηµος in Plato’s Symposium 
(181a) where it is opposed to the word ‘heavenly’ (οὐράνιος), both applied to Aphrodite in 
order to distinguish two types of erotic desire. 
13 For another example see the beginning of Dio Chrysostom’s Olympic Oration (Or. 12). 
14 Epist. 1, 1–5, to Nikandros. Synesius’ phrase is alluded to in Psellos’ Letter 5.12–14, ed. 
Gautier (1986); for its presence in other Byzantine writers see also below. 
15 Of the 58 surviving mss. of Dion, the earliest dates to the tenth century: Par. Coisl. 249, 
described in Devreesse (1945: 228–29). The contents of this manuscript are revealing of the 
kinds of texts with which Synesius was associated in Byzantium and the kind of readers 
that he attracted (one should note that several marginal scholia accompany the texts). The 
book begins with the rhetorico-philosophical works of Synesius (including his Dion, 
excluding his letters) followed by a Neoplatonic presentation of the ideal philosopher 
(Marinus’ Life of Proclus), then Gorgias with brief extracts from Dionysius of Halicar-
nassus, then orations of Aeschines and Lysias, and, in conclusion, by Synesius again, his 
On Kingship. See further Brancacci (1985: 201–313) on the influence of, especially, 
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title of the text refers to Dio Chrysostom, the Greek philosopher-rhetor of 
the first century CE. The essay begins as a refutation of Philostratus’ view of 
Dio Chrysostom, but then turns to a lengthy self-promoting elaboration of 
what Synesius considers to be the philosopher’s relation to discourse in 
general, and rhetoric in particular.  
Synesius’ tone is often polemical, as if he engages in self-defence in the 
vein of Socrates’ Apology—indeed, Socrates is a primary model for 
Synesius in this speech (especially in paragraphs 14–15). Several opponents 
are in Synesius’ mind, as may be gleaned both from Dion itself (primarily 
8.8–10 and 10.2) and from the letter which accompanied Dion when it was 
sent to Synesius’ teacher, Hypatia, in Alexandria (Epist. 154). These 
opponents are contemporary ascetics, who claim to be ‘philosophers’ but 
negate discourse entirely, and fellow rhetoricians, who, either as performers 
or as teachers, submit themselves to their audience’s temporary desires for 
sensual pleasure. 
Furthermore, Synesius opposes the Roman Greek rhetorical view re-
garding the relation between philosophy and rhetoric, best exemplified by 
Philostratus’ Lives of the Sophists. Unlike Philostratus and other Roman 
Greek rhetors, such as Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Aelius Aristides—all 
of whom remained influential for Byzantine writers—Synesius does not 
wish to defend the philosophical aspirations of rhetoric, but, rather, the rhe-
torical practices of the philosopher. These earlier rhetors were concerned 
with the elevation of the status of rhetoric by making it appear as ‘philoso-
phical’ as possible.16 By comparison, Synesius (or, for that matter, Gregory 
of Nazianzus, and, as we shall see, later authors like Michael Psellos) had an 
almost opposite aim: to open up philosophy so as to allow rhetoric as a sup-
plementary and, possibly, essential component of the philosopher’s practice. 
What interests me here, beyond the polemics, are the details of the ideal 
philosopher as projected by Synesius onto Dio, and as embodied in the Dion 
by Synesius himself. Let me distil some of the parameters of this ideal 
‘philosopher’. Synesius’ overarching argument is that, while ‘philosophy’ 
allows the philosopher to relate to oneself and to the divine, logos (by which 
Synesius means discursive, linguistic form in general, including rhetoric) is 
an indispensable tool. With it, the philosopher relates to others, whether for 
                                                                                                                       
Synesius’ Dion in Byzantium; for discussion of the text itself, see Treu (1958) with Schmitt 
(2001: 37–38 and 67–143). 
16 On the attempt to imagine or defend a more ‘philosophical rhetoric’ see Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus, On Ancient Rhetors 1; Aelius Aristides, To Plato, on Rhetoric (e.g. 74.1–2: 
φιλοσοφία τις οὖσα ἡ ῥητορικὴ φαίνεται) and Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists (e.g. 
1.480.1–11 and 481.12–26) and Life of Apollonius 5.40. 
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the sake of intervening morally in the affairs of the polis or for the sake of 
private pleasure amongst the select few (5.2 with 8.1–9.11). Discourse is 
thus accorded an important functionality in the public and private sphere 
and is presented as necessary for the philosopher’s earthly, communal exis-
tence. 
Furthermore, Synesius submits logos to an hierarchical distinction be-
tween what is termed civic and rhetorical discourse. The former is more ap-
propriate for the philosopher.17 The latter, by contrast, is the inferior kind, 
since rhetoric addresses the public settings of the festival and theatre (3.2–5) 
and aims primarily at sensual gratification (1.4 and 3.5). Be that as it may, 
unlike the distance instituted between rhetoric and philosophy in the intro-
duction of the On Kingship, here in Dion, Synesius advocates for a philoso-
pher who must engage with both types of discourse. This engagement is to 
happen either during the gradual process of philosophical education or, also 
later, in the philosopher’s life (especially 4.1–3).  
Two reasons seem to necessitate this integration of discourse in its total-
ity. First, such openness to logos is what, in Synesius’ view, marks an origi-
nally Hellenic philosopher. To be ‘precisely Hellenic’ and ‘native’ to the 
Hellenic heritage, as Synesius wishes to be, is to embrace Hellenic discourse 
in its entirety (and this includes the inferior rhetoric) and therefore be able to 
make a genealogical claim on a powerful cultural capital, the capital of 
Hellenism.18 
Synesius cannot do without this capital if he is—and this is the second 
reason—to retain his public, aristocratic authority, separate from contempo-
rary competing types of authority defined by Roman/Constantinopolitan 
imperial power and Christian scripture. Synesius insists that discourse is the 
tool with which the philosopher may impart morality to ‘rulers’ and ‘private 
individuals’ and thus acquire authority within society.19 At that, discourse is 
persistently associated with δύναµις and its cognates.20 Resorting to dis-
                                                
17 This is a discourse, we read, that is ‘ancient, according to nature, and appropriate to its 
subjects’: τὸ ἀρχαῖον κατὰ φύσιν ἔχον καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειµένοις οἰκεῖον (Dion 3.3); see 
further 1.13, 3.8 and 4.1. 
18 See Dion 4.3; see further 6.2, 8, 9.1 (‘native’ philosopher), 9.3 (‘Hellenic conduct’), 9.6 
and 11.2 (on the Hellenic genealogy to which Synesius belongs) with Epist. 41, 240–43. 
For such use of Hellenism see e.g. Elm (2003) with Whitmarsh (2004: 139–58). 
19 Cf. Dion 1.14; 2.2; 3.1; see further 9.6–10.1 on the practice of virtue as a preparatory 
philosophical phase. 
20 See e.g. Dion 3 and 14, on Dio’s and Socrates’ discursive power respectively, or 5, on the 
discursive inability of Synesius’ opponents, the ones who disregard rhetoric and poetry. See 
also how it is in discourse that Synesius locates his god-given gift of ‘being able for the 
greatest things and willing the best’ (δύνασθαί τε τὰ µέγιστα καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα βού-
λεσθαι); see Against Andronikos, To the Bishops (Epist. 41, 106–7). 
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course may be a necessity, imposed upon the philosopher by his earthly and 
communal existence. It is also, however, a natural outcome of the philoso-
pher’s power of display (5.4): ‘As God gave substance to the bodies of 
forms as visible images of his invisible powers [δυνάµεις], thus also a 
beautiful soul being fecund with what is best’, Synesius argues of the phi-
losopher, ‘has its power [δύναµις] transmissible to the outside.’21 
 
Synesius, therefore, argues for the philosopher’s adoption of rhetoric. This 
adoption or, indeed, appropriation should not to be confused with some kind 
of rhetorical philosophy, an indissoluble mixture of the two disciplines. 
Rather, Synesius envisions a double life for the philosopher. As is made 
clear throughout the Dion, rhetoric and philosophy remain distinct and un-
mixed enterprises. Tellingly, for instance, Synesius imagines discourse as a 
performance that surrounds without ever touching the philosopher’s true 
self; it may communicate the philosopher’s inner truth to the select few but 
also conceals it from the uninitiated (5.7 with 18.1–5). 
This distinction of the two disciplines—evident in Synesius and else-
where in contemporary and earlier Greek writing—should be kept in mind 
because it serves to retain the hierarchical superiority of philosophy and 
promote it (and not rhetoric) as the primary profession and identity marker. 
For, though he appropriates rhetoric, Synesius strives to identify exclusively 
with philosophy. In it, he finds an essential, divinely originating autonomy: 
‘Why should I be’, he claims (12.9–10), ‘a slave to anything fixed, when it 
is possible to fully possess autonomy [αὐτονοµία], and lead my discourses 
where I decide to lead them, not being judged by the negligence of listeners 
but by having myself as a measure? This is the fate that God gave to me, 
namely to be without a master [ἀδέσποτος] and free [ἄφετος].’ A memo-
rable remark, yet not uncommon among early Byzantine writers.22 The phi-
losopher’s autonomy is, for part of this intellectual tradition, an absolute 
category, indeed an ontological category, the fixed and natural boundary 
that separates the real philosopher from others that might compete for his 
superior authority.23 It is only from this secure horizon that intellectu-
als/aristocrats like Synesius can open philosophy to rhetoric. 
                                                
21 See further Epist. 41, 116–18 and 184–85. 
22 Cf. Dion 14.5 with Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 36.12, another strong proclamation of the 
‘philosopher’ as an ‘autonomous’ creature. Cf. also Proclus, In Remp. 1.65.8–13. 
23 On philosophy and the philosopher’s freedom associated with a specific (aristocratic) 
physis, in other words a specific ontology, see Synesius, Dion 6.1, Epist. 41, 94–96 and On 
Providence 1.2. The notion is, of course, Platonic (cf. Phaedr. 252e2–5) and Neoplatonic 
(recurrent in Proclus’ commentary on the Republic). 
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Michael Psellos, the rhetor-philosopher 
This careful appropriation of rhetoric for the philosopher’s self-
representation will not be repeated in Byzantine writing for some time. Even 
if the two professions continued to exist and thrive until at least the sixth 
century in urban centres of the Eastern Mediterranean, neither philosophers 
nor rhetors seem to have felt the necessity to justify their profession. 
Teachers of rhetoric like Libanius in Antioch, Gregory’s contemporary, or 
Procopius and Choricius, rhetoricians at the sixth-century school of Gaza, 
appear self-confident and secure in their practice, showing no need to 
ground it in the profession of philosophy.24 Similar was the attitude of 
philosophers. Though they dealt extensively with discursive form and the 
value of rhetoric—as, for instance, in the Neoplatonic schools of Athens and 
Alexandria in order both to explicate Plato’s texts and clarify Plato’s 
position regarding the epistemological place of discourse—they could do so 
safely. I mean that these philosophers approached rhetoric primarily from a 
theoretical perspective, rather than as a more urgent matter of social posi-
tioning.25 
As we move to later centuries, the concern over the exact relation be-
tween philosophy and rhetoric was further diminished, since the fate of the 
two professions was markedly different. With the transformation and, in 
large parts of former Byzantine territory, the gradual disappearance of the 
Greek-speaking urban élite, a process that lasted from the seventh into the 
early ninth century, the importance of rhetoric receded along with many 
other aspects of Greco-roman urban culture.26 It is safe to assume that rheto-
ric did not disappear completely, but, as far as our sources tell us, those who 
had access to books, writing and public speaking did not place a significant 
value upon the profession of rhetoric as such.27 Hagiography, church homi-
                                                
24 Professing philosophy is not a seminal concern for Libanius (cf. his lengthy auto-
biographical oration [Or. 1]). Similarly, being a ‘rhetor’ is a recurrent claim in the writings 
of Procopius and, especially, Choricius; see the latter’s Funeral Oration in Honour of 
Procopius 1.11–12 (Op. 8) where a personified Rhetoric is introduced lamenting for the 
loss of her best practitioner, Procopius. 
25 See e.g. the Neoplatonic readings of rhetoric and, in general, discursive form in Hermias’ 
scholia on Plato’s Phaedrus, Olympiodorus’ commentary on the Gorgias, and, of course, 
Proclus’ commentaries on the Cratylus and the Republic. 
26 For an overview of the fate of the Byzantine urban world in this period, see Haldon 
(1997) with Wickham (2005). 
27 Procopius of Caesarea (writing in the 550s) seems to be the last early Byzantine writer 
before the tenth century to be designated by the name ‘the rhetor’; cf. the manuscript titles 
of Procopius’ works as well as references to Procopius in Agathias, Histories 7.22 and 
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letics, ecclesiastical poetry and biblical exegesis take the place of rhetoric 
which (along with classicizing poetry) was relegated to past types of dis-
course, preoccupied with ‘lying’.28 
‘Philosophy’, by contrast, remained more or less intact as a claim to 
authority—despite the feeling of despair that can be felt in some late antique 
philosophical historiography.29 Whether in John of Damascus’ Neoplatonic 
definition of philosophy or the revival of the reading of Plato, Aristotelian 
logic and Neoplatonic thought in the course of the ninth century, whether in 
the redefinition of philosophia as the ascetic way of life in patristic and 
hagiographical writings or in the association of philosophy with divination 
and occult practices, the title ‘philosopher’ retained its social currency.30 
Nevertheless, gradually, during the tenth century primarily, one wit-
nesses a revival both of rhetoric as a value-giving discursive practice and of 
the distinction of rhetoric vs. philosophy in definitions of the ideal intellec-
tual.31 Practising and being exposed to rhetorical discourse is now again re-
garded as a welcome preparatory stage and additional qualification in the 
philosopher’s curriculum vitae—this is particularly the case when tenth-
century Byzantine writers refer to the curricula of such early Byzantine 
‘philosophers’ as Synesius and Gregory of Nazianzus.32 
                                                                                                                       
9.13–14. For a review of learning in the period between the sixth and the ninth century, see 
Moffatt (1977). 
28 Typical is the phrase by Basil of Caesarea anthologized in the 8th-century compilation 
Sacra Parallela (in Migne, PG 96: col. 341.19–23): Ῥητορικὴ καὶ ποιητικὴ, καὶ ἡ τῶν 
σοφισµάτων εὕρεσις, πολλοὺς ἀπεσχόλησεν, ὧ ν  ὕ λ η  τ ὸ  ψ ε ῦ δ ό ς  ἐ σ τ ι ν .  Οὔτε 
γὰρ ποιητικὴ συστῆναι δύναται ἄνευ τοῦ µύθου, οὔτε ῥητορικὴ ἄνευ τῆς ἐν τῷ λέγειν 
τέχνης, οὔτε σοφιστικὴ ἄνευ τῶν παραλογισµῶν. This conception of rhetoric is a 
Byzantine commonplace, especially in monastic literature; cf. e.g. Theodore the Studite, 
Epitaphios on Plato, his Spiritual Father, proem (PG 99: col. 804a) and Symeon the New 
Theologian, Ethical Orations 9.59. 
29 Cf. Damascius, The Philosophical History 150, ed. Athanassiadi (1999). 
30 The Neoplatonic and ascetic definitions are conveniently reviewed in Duffy (2002: 139–
43) with further bibliography. On the profession of philosophia appropriated by ascetics see 
e.g. Darrouzès (1961, index s.v. ‘philosophia’). On the ninth-century revival, see Lemerle 
(1971). On logic, see Bydén (2003: 217, n. 6). On philosophia and the occult, see Mag-
dalino & Mavroudi (2006: esp. p. 13). See further Bydén (2003: 1–39), for a recent account 
on philosophy and philosophers in Byzantium. 
31 Niketas David from Paphlagonia (late 9th–early 10th c.), Arethas’ pupil, who, in the 
manuscript titles of his works, is designated as ‘rhetor’ and ‘philosopher’ alternatively, is a 
good example of this trend. See also John Geometres, Letter Describing a Garden 9. 
32 See e.g. Suda, sigma.1511 on Synesius and, especially, gamma.450 on Gregory of 
Nazianzus, who καὶ ἐς φιλοσοφίαν ἐξήσκητο καὶ ῥήτωρ ἦν ἀµφιδέξιος (notably, the same 
exact wording is given in the biography of Apollinaris of Laodicea, who is presented as an 
acquaintance of Gregory of Nazianzus and Basil of Caesarea: alpha.3397). 
Rhetoric and the philosopher    181 
 
This revival of rhetoric as profession should be placed within the context 
of the intellectuals’ position in the shifting social structures of Constantino-
politan politics, from the ninth through to the twelfth century.33 To some 
extent, certain features of Synesius’ late antique situation remain intact in 
middle Byzantine Constantinopolitan society. This is a society in which so-
cial authority continues to be determined by acts and discourses of self-
fashioning. Constantinopolitan—courtly or urban—aristocracy, clerics and 
monks, intellectuals, teachers and bureaucrats all continue to compete 
within a fluid social arena that is defined more by shifting networks of kin-
ship and friendship, than by any stable social stratification.34 Of course, cer-
tain people and groups fare better than others in achieving, maintaining and 
re-enforcing their authority particularly through association with by now 
well-established social formations. The court, the monasteries, and the 
church—to name the three most important such formations—and the indi-
viduals that become part of them remain the primary producers of social 
meaning and, consequently, holders of authority. 
As far as we can tell, during most of the ninth and part of the tenth cen-
tury, Byzantine intellectuals indeed emerge through the ranks of hegemonic 
social formations and those social groups that belong to the upper echelons 
of Byzantine society. Theodore the Studite, patriarch Photios, Constantine 
VII, but also Leo the Philosopher, Arethas, Niketas Magistros, Theodore 
Daphnopates, and John Geometres are members of an intellectual élite 
chiefly by already being members of a social élite.35 This is a social status 
that they share with the early Byzantine intellectuals whom they value and 
imitate. Like Synesius and Gregory of Nazianzus, most of these Byzantine 
writers add intellectual authority (occasionally infused with Hellenic cul-
tural capital) to a pre-existing social power. They already possess this power 
through their aristocratic lineage and association with the powerful social 
formations mentioned above. 
By contrast, authors like the so-called Anonymous Professor (ed. 
Markopoulos 2000), a tenth-century Constantinopolitan teacher, John 
Sikeliotes, a commentator of Hermogenes in the early eleventh century, 
Michael Psellos and John Italos, teachers of philosophy in the eleventh 
century, and Michael Italikos and Theodore Prodromos, rhetoricians of the 
                                                
33 The picture provided here cannot but be a cursory one; for some preliminary discussion 
of the social position of Byzantine authors, see Beck (1978: 123–25) with Kazhdan & 
Wharton Epstein (1985: 130–33). 
34 Cf. Haldon (2006; 2009). 
35 Cf. Lauxtermann (2003: 34–45) for a discussion of similar issues from the perspective of 
patronage. 
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twelfth, represent a new intellectual type in Constantinopolitan culture. 
These writers—most characteristically among them Psellos—acquire access 
to political authority primarily by creating an intellectual authority for 
themselves.36 This intellectual authority is produced through semi-private 
teaching—and, thus, through the most precarious and least defined of 
Byzantine institutions, the school—as well as through public speaking.37 
Intellectual authority is thus made through the profession of philosophy and 
rhetoric, in a social environment in which teachers and rhetorical performers 
are more easily expendable—in comparison to, say, aristocrats, bishops, or 
abbots. Intellectuals like Psellos are not insiders of the Byzantine economy 
of power; rather, they operate peripherally. In effect, they produce 
philosophical and rhetorical meaning, yet neither for an audience that is 
given nor with a fixed place in the Byzantine cultural market. 
 
In precisely this setting—the increasing visibility of philosophers/teachers 
and rhetors/performers in Constantinopolitan society—, Psellos revives a 
Synesian framework in order to configure the relation between the two pro-
fessions. As was the case with Synesius, Psellos identifies himself first as a 
philosopher, sometimes adopting a strict opposition between philosophy and 
rhetoric and distancing himself safely from the latter and its practitioners.38 
Following Synesius, Psellos speaks equally of the necessity of discourse and 
invents various ways in which rhetoric may be acceptable for the philoso-
pher.39 He writes, for instance, of the ‘civic’, ‘ancient’ and ‘purified’ rheto-
ric that he, unlike his contemporaries, pursues and imparts, and he also de-
fends both the classical and the late antique roots of this elevated rhetoric.40  
                                                
36 In this, Psellos and other such Byzantine intellectuals were much like Cicero, ‘a political 
outsider without the authenticating pedigree of ancestors who had held high elected office’, 
or like Stephen Greenblatt’s Renaissance writers, who could not root ‘personal identity in 
the identity of clan or caste’; see Dugan (2005: 1) with Greenblatt (1980: 9). 
37 On middle Byzantine (especially 11th-century) education, see Lemerle (1977), with 
Agapitos (1998) and Markopoulos (2006); on rhetoric, see Mullett (2003). On the rise of 
the importance of paideia during the course of the tenth century, see, further, Gaul (2010: 
76–77). 
38 See e.g. Phil. min. I 36.10–14 or Letter 110, ed. Sathas (1876: 354.23–29). 
39 See e.g. Letter 11, ed. Sathas (1876: 242.21–25). 
40 Cf. Letter 224, ed. Kurtz & Drexl (1941), with Synesius, Dion 3.3; and Chron. VI 23 
with Synesius, Letter 1. See also Psellos, Letter 174, ed. Sathas (1876: 442.23–25): 
ἐργάζοµαι δὲ οὐ τ ὴ ν  π ά ν δ η µ ο ν  ῥητορικήν, οὐδὲ τὴν θεατρικὴν καὶ ἀκόλαστον 
… ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκουρόν τε καὶ σώφρονα with n. 14 above. On Synesius’ Dion and its 
presence in Psellos’ presentation of the rhetorical style of Gregory of Nazianzus, see Levy 
(1912: 41); for further Synesian allusions in Psellos, see Papaioannou (2000). 
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Nevertheless, beyond Synesius or any other premodern Greek writer, 
Psellos’ most frequent stance on the matter is to advocate the indissoluble 
mixture of philosophy and rhetoric, the creation of a ‘commingled science’ 
(σύµµικτος ἐπιστήµη), as he calls it.41 It is this mixture which Psellos 
propagates in his lectures and letters, which he ascribes to his most cher-
ished models, such as Plato and Gregory of Nazianzus, and about which he 
praises intellectual figures of the past and the present (most important 
among them is the tenth-century writer Symeon Metaphrastes, nearly an 
‘alter ego’ for Psellos, for whom he wrote an extensive encomium).42 Most 
interestingly, when writing in the first person singular, Psellos’ adopted per-
sona is consistently that of a learned man who perfectly joins philosophy 
with rhetoric: ‘in my soul’, he writes, ‘as if in a single mixing bowl,43 I mix 
philosophy and rhetoric together’.44 For the first time in the history of the 
philosophico-rhetorical debate, the combination of philosophy with rhetoric 
is imagined as the ideal philosopher’s unified and single discursive prac-
tice.45 
 
In order to highlight some of the details as well as the importance of this 
self-representational gesture, it is worth looking closer at one of the many 
instances in which Psellos describes this ‘commingling’. The text is the 
lengthy autobiographical digression that Psellos inserts into his Chrono-
graphia while describing the reign of his most important patron, the em-
peror Constantine IX Monomachos (Book VI, chs. 36–46). Written some-
time in the early 1060s, this narrative describes Psellos’ gradual entrance to 
Monomachos’ court in 1043 (when Psellos was twenty-five years old). 
Psellos begins by presenting the two fundamental areas of his studies: 
‘rhetorical discourse in order to be able to mould [πλάσασθαι] language’ 
                                                
41 Letter 223, ed. Kurtz and Drexl (1941: 265.5–6). 
42 Of the numerous examples, see Letters 174 and 188, ed. Sathas (1876); Theol. I 98 (on 
Plato); Poem 7.177–78; Theol. I 102.4–6; Theol. II 6.139–40 (the last three references on 
Gregory of Nazianzus); and Or. hag. 7 passim, esp. ll. 62–70 (on Symeon Metaphrastes). 
Cf. Theol. I 79.73–78 (a critique of the style of Maximus the Confessor, the ‘philosopher’) 
and Theol. I 47.80–89 (a critique of John Sikeliotes; in Psellos’ view, Sikeliotes, though a 
‘sophist’ in reality, titled himself a ‘philosopher’ and attacked such able ‘sophists’ as 
Synesius, Libanius or Procopius). 
43 An allusion to Plato, Timaeus 41d4–6? 
44 Or. min. 8.191–92: ὥσπερ ἐφ’ ἑνὶ κρατῆρι τῇ ἐµῇ ψυχῇ φιλοσοφίαν καὶ ῥητορικὴν 
ὁµοῦ συγκεράννυµι. See also Kustas (1973: 196–97). 
45 In this respect, I disagree with the view put forth in Jenkins (2006: 145) that ‘it would be 
difficult to argue that he [i.e. Psellos] was any more insistent than Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus had been in the 1st century’ with respect to the mixture of rhetoric with 
philosophy. For Dionysius of Halicarnassus, see the discussion above. 
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and ‘philosophy in order to purify the mind’ (ch. 36). His contact with 
rhetoric, Psellos declares, was such that he could possess its ‘powers’ 
(δύνασθαι is the verb used) of argumentation, but not so much that he 
might ‘follow’ rhetoric ‘in every aspect’. Psellos graduated to philosophy, 
starting with ‘natural’ discourses and reaching ‘first philosophy’ (namely 
theology)46 by way of the ‘middle knowledge’ (namely mathematics, as may 
be inferred from ch. 38). So far so good; like a good ‘traditional’ intel-
lectual, Psellos appropriates rhetorical discourse as an introductory step 
toward higher pursuits. Indeed, the paragraphs that follow in the narrative 
(chs. 37 through 40) tell only of Psellos’ philosophical achievements: his 
resuscitation of wisdom, his intellectual journey from the commentary tradi-
tion to the original sources, Aristotle and Plato, and then back to Plotinus, 
Porphyry, Iamblichus and the ‘great harbour’ of Proclus. Finally, we read of 
Psellos’ ultimate exploration of all—even extra-discursive—knowledge, 
using as his intellectual base his own ‘single science of everything’. 
After such a curriculum of gradual intellectual ascent, one might not ex-
pect to encounter rhetoric again. Yet Psellos returns to rhetoric in chapter 
41. Unlike his earlier remark where he seemed unwilling to identify with the 
study of rhetoric, here he states directly that his discourse always combines 
both rhetoric and philosophy, a combination that, as he claims, makes him 
unique. Rhetoric in this chapter is not presented as simply preparatory of 
philosophy; rather, it is regarded as a fundamental constituent of the philo-
sopher’s discursive practice. Indeed, after Psellos has recounted his engage-
ment with theology and patristic writings and repeated his unmatched con-
tribution in the Constantinopolitan revival of classical and early Byzantine 
knowledge (chs. 42–43), he seems to nearly forget his ‘philosophical’ iden-
tity. For he concludes his autobiographical digression with three paragraphs 
(chs. 44–46) devoted almost entirely to a disturbingly self-confident praise 
of his own unique rhetorical nature, to what he alludes as his ‘natural vir-
tue’, and its enchanting effect upon Constantine Monomachos. 
Thus, while Psellos begins his philosophical self-representation by pre-
venting himself from being completely immersed in rhetoric, the narrative 
returns to the mixture of philosophy with rhetoric, and then reaches its cul-
mination in equating Psellos’ ‘nature’ with his pleasure-generating elo-
quence.47 The pattern is not uncommon in his texts and, I would argue, is 
                                                
46 A common Neoplatonic term, ultimately from Aristotle (Metaph. VI 1025b3–1026a32); 
see, e.g., John Philoponus, On Aristotle On the Soul 58.7–21 with Psellos, Phil. min. II 13, 
37.32–38.13. 
47 For a different reading of this section of the Chronographia, see Kaldellis (1999: 127–
41). Though Kaldellis is right to argue that one of the main themes of the Chronographia is 
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telling of Psellos’ approach. Psellos first rehearses the constraints of the 
Byzantine tradition, where rhetoric is a clearly distinct and hierarchically 
inferior category. Then proceeding beyond the tradition, he joins philosophy 
with rhetoric in a nearly indissoluble mixture. In due course, Psellos will 
occasionally identify with what, until then, had been regarded as inferior, 
namely rhetorical appearance and its affectations.48 
 
Let us look at two more examples, two texts that stem from Psellos’ educa-
tional practice. The first is an attempt at a definition of philosophy (Phil. 
min. I 2), while the second is a university lecture that addressed the insistent 
desire of Psellos’ students that their philosopher-teacher should lecture on 
the value of myth (Or. min. 25). In the former text, Psellos imagines phi-
losophy both as an autonomous entity (philosophy, we are told, ‘is both in 
everything and outside everything’) and as a universal activity: philosophy 
‘spins around together with the heaven’ and mixes all knowledge (20–28). 
This philosophical totality of knowledge includes rhetoric, which is explic-
itly placed, as one might expect, toward the bottom of the epistemic lad-
der.49 Yet, in defining rhetoric, Psellos imagines this inferior discipline in 
terms that are strikingly reminiscent of philosophy’s qualities. Rhetoric too 
is a universalizing practice that mixes everything (69–71)—Psellos even 
posits a possible comparison of rhetoric too with ‘the heaven that has its 
perfection in the infinity of its motion’ (76–78). And, like philosophy, rheto-
ric too is autonomous—indeed Psellos names rhetoric, and rhetoric alone, 
an αὐτονοµοθεσία, a discipline regulated solely by its own principles (80–
84). 
In the second text, Psellos assumes a similar stance. His lecture on myth 
is structured around an intricate rhetorical strategy that divides the lecture (a 
total of 188 lines in the Teubner edition) in two. During the first half of the 
lecture (lines 1–95), Psellos feigns a strong resistance to his students’ desire 
to talk about myth. He, a philosopher, has by now ‘traversed matter and has 
ascended almost to the Forms’ and thus reacts to those who wish of him to 
imitate a ‘sophist’ like Dio Chrysostom in offering an encomium of myth. 
At nearly the exact middle of the text (line 96 onward), however, Psellos 
                                                                                                                       
‘the rise of Psellos himself and the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy in his 
thought and career’ (ibid. 138), I find somewhat unconvincing the notion that rhetoric was 
integrated by Psellos only to the extent that it provided a disguise for his ‘true’ project 
(namely philosophy and its Platonist and likely anti-religious thrust). 
48 For more examples and further discussion, see Papaioannou (forthcoming). 
49 For this hierarchical structure, see O’Meara, ‘Political Philosophy in Michael Psellos’ (in 
this volume). 
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changes his course and begins to discuss myth, offering an impressive de-
fence for its value.  
This defence consists of pressing further both the philosophical and rhe-
torical value of myth advocated by earlier philosophical and rhetorical the-
ory. In earlier writing, myth is useful either as a cover for philosophical 
truth (as Neoplatonic exegesis of Homer argued—for instance in Proclus’ 
commentary on the Republic) or as preparatory for the acquisition of the 
skill of persuasion (as was claimed in Byzantine discussions of the progym-
nasma of mythos—for example in John Doxapatres’ eleventh-century com-
mentary on Aphthonius). For Psellos, however, this valuation of myth is not 
enough. Rather, in this lecture, myth is imagined as—significantly for us 
here—an ‘arrogant rhetor … who fashions and refashions his intended 
meaning in whichever way he wills’ and is proclaimed to be ‘music, supe-
rior to philosophy’ (173; a strategic misreading of Socrates’ final moments 
in Plato’s Phaedo).50 Though in the beginning of the text Psellos, the ‘philo-
sopher’, distances himself from the inferior discourse of myth, by the end of 
the lecture he has elevated myth, the ‘rhetor’, to an unprecedented height. 
These two texts with their parallel imagining of the two disciplines (phi-
losophy and rhetoric) and the temporary favour granted to inferior discourse 
(the αὐτονοµοθεσία of rhetoric in the first and myth imagined as a per-
sonified rhetor in the second) should not be read as Psellos’ elaboration of a 
philosophical question. Psellos does not put forth here any detailed elabora-
tion of the relation between philosophy and rhetoric or between myth and 
philosophical discourse. Psellos, I believe, has a different concern. Both 
texts are about self-representation, about promoting Psellos with his rhetori-
cal philosophy as the ideal intellectual figure.  
Notably, the first essay ends with Psellos’ wish that someone ‘who has 
arrived at the habit of knowledge [ἐπιστήµη]’ might exist, a person who, in 
a contemporary world of people who only practice separate disciplines, 
would ‘bring together into one thing’ and ‘unite and mix together’ the vari-
                                                
50 According to Plato’s Phaedo (60d–61b), Socrates had a recurrent dream to ‘create music 
and work at it’, which he revisited during his final moments. Initially, Socrates interpreted 
the dream as a mere cheer for him to continue exactly what he was doing: philosophy, ‘the 
greatest kind of music’ (a phrase which was, notably, evoked in Neoplatonic definitions of 
philosophy with which Psellos would have been familiar; cf. e.g. Proclus, In Remp. 1, 57.8–
23 and 60.24–25 and David, Proleg. 25.19–24 with John Tzetzes, Chil. 10.597). Then, 
however, Socrates decided that the dream was urging him to practice ‘music’ in the regular 
sense; hence, he turned to the making of poetry (though still without ‘creating myths’!). By 
contrast, as Psellos cites the story, it is myth that is implied as ‘the greatest kind of music’. 
For the episode in the Phaedo, see Roochnik (2001); for Psellos’ reading, see also Kolovou 
(2009). 
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ous types of knowledge (including rhetoric) in order to produce one single 
and ‘most beautiful living creature upon earth’. Who else is that ‘someone’ 
if not Psellos himself who repeatedly proclaims his proficiency in every 
type of knowledge and, especially, his mixture of rhetoric with philosophy? 
Similarly, Psellos concludes his lecture on myth by urging his students to 
welcome myth into their very inner core, their soul: ‘Should we not receive 
him’, Psellos asks, ‘with utter reverence? Dine him with the best that we 
have? Let him rest in our soul as if in a house, providing him our mind 
[νοῦς] as his bed, entirely covered with beautiful sights? If we let him 
inhabit us in this manner, he too will honour us back and give us the starting 
points of fictions [πλάσµατα] and the art and power of persuasion.’ Who 
else, we might ask, is this skilled visitor than Psellos himself, the rhetor, to 
whom, for instance, Monomachos, as we read in the Chronographia at the 
end of the section discussed above, allowed entrance to his very ‘heart’?51 
 
The philosopher’s politics 
With its explicit mixture of philosophy and rhetoric and its temporary 
valuation of the inferior discipline, Psellos’ self-representational stance is 
unlike anything else in his distant and immediate past. While other Byzan-
tine writers, such as Synesius, occasionally join the two professions and flirt 
with the aesthetic value of rhetoric, they neither put the mixture of philoso-
phy with rhetoric so ostensibly on display nor does their flirting with rhe-
torical identity ever result in sacrificing—however temporarily—the 
traditional belief in the primacy of philosophy. By contrast, Psellos maxi-
mizes what is a latent notion in Greek autobiographical tradition: rather than 
preparatory, supplementary, or just superfluous, rhetoric is central to the 
philosopher’s social persona.  
At that, Psellos is innovative when placed in the history of Greek 
philosophers’ self-referential writing. Simultaneously, as I would like to ar-
gue, he brings to the fore—though, as we shall see, with a twist—certain 
conceptual trends that are evident in middle Byzantine rhetorical theory. 
Just like Byzantine self-representation, the field of Byzantine rhetorical the-
ory (for instance, the commentaries in Hermogenes’ corpus and 
Aphthonius’ progymnasmata) remains largely unexplored, especially in 
                                                
51 Chron. VI 46: Τοῖς µὲν οὖν ἄλλοις καιρὸν εἶχε καὶ µέτρον ἡ πρὸς αὐτὸν εἴσοδος, ἐµοὶ 
δὲ καὶ α ἱ  τ ῆ ς  κ α ρ δ ί α ς  α ὐ τῷ  π ύ λ α ι  ἀνεπετάννυντο, καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ 
προϊόντι ξύµπαντα ἐπεδείκνυτο. 
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regard to the question that interests us here, the relation between rhetoric 
and philosophy.52  
Among Byzantine rhetorical theorists, the work of John Sikeliotes in the 
early eleventh century mentioned above, stands out for its attempt to 
redefine rhetoric in accordance to theological or, better (as Sikeliotes him-
self saw it), philosophical premises.53 In the introduction to his commentary 
on Hermogenes’ On Forms, Sikeliotes suggests that the πάνδηµος rhetoric 
(an evocation of a Synesian concept) is necessary for all those who desire to 
learn the ‘science of politics’ (πολιτικὴ ἐπιστήµη), ‘even if’, Sikeliotes 
continues, ‘Plato—unworthily of Plato himself—condemned [κατεπ-
αινεῖν]54 the fire of rhetoric which is beneficial to the public and belongs to 
everyone [πάνδηµος]’.55 
Accordingly, Sikeliotes imagines the ideal rhetor as what he calls a ‘civic 
[πολιτικός] philosopher’.56 This philosopher is, as he explains in the 
commentary itself, ‘a rhetor who is not simply a rhetor, but someone who 
orders and adorns moral character, leading humankind toward what is more 
rational and, indeed, truly human by turning … all irrationality to its op-
posite’ (376.3–14). The primary examples of such political philosophers are, 
as one might expect, the ‘teachers of the Church’ who ‘fashion and order 
not only cities, but also moral character’ (469.27–470.1). The fathers, we 
read, ‘joined civic discourse’ with whatever is ‘absolutely necessary’ for 
man to ‘commune’ with God and thus ‘raised our nature to the nature of 
eternity’. This new kind of rhetoric, Sikeliotes further states, ‘is the true 
civic discourse [πολιτικὸς λό γος], the one that grants lawfulness to the 
powers of our souls, those intelligible cities [πόλεις], … introducing peace 
… and transferring us to that original polity from which we were snatched 
away’ (466.17–470.7). 
                                                
52 Kustas’ admirable work (1973) is the first attempt to map Byzantine rhetorical theory, 
though many of his arguments would now require revision. 
53 Sikeliotes’ work is to be placed during the reign of Basil II (after 1000?) though the 
details of his biography are unknown, except what one might glean from an auto-
biographical note he inserted in his commentary to Hermogenes (see Commentary on On 
the Forms, ed. Walz 1834: 446.24–448.15), where Sikeliotes refers to speeches that he 
composed (no examples of which survive), one of them delivered in the Constantinopolitan 
suburb of Pikridion at the order (?) of Basil II. On Sikeliotes see Kustas (1973: 21 and 
passim), with Mazzucchi (1990) and Conley (2003). 
54 The word is wrongly translated as ‘loben, preisen’ in LBG, citing this very passage. 
55 Prolegomena, ed. Rabe (1931: 393–95). 
56 See Commentary on On the Forms, ed. Walz (1834: 466.1–470.7 with 217.7–8; 376.3–4). 
Sikeliotes’ terms here may partly originate in Hermias, Scholia on Plato’s Phaedrus 
221.13–24. On the emphasis on the ‘civic’ definition of rhetoric in Byzantium, see further 
Schouler (1995). 
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What seems to be at stake here is the anxiety to retain the value of 
rhetoric in a social context, such as that of medieval Constantinople, where 
the models of public speech are no longer pagan rhetors, but Christian 
‘philosophers’ like Gregory of Nazianzus (or indeed like Sikeliotes himself 
who is titled ‘philosopher’ in the manuscripts that transmit his commen-
tary). For Sikeliotes, the way to address this anxiety is to regard rhetoric as a 
necessary part of the philosopher’s political responsibility, which is trans-
lated in his view as the responsibility to impart morality. Rhetoric can there-
by be reclaimed as a proper philosophical activity, which addresses the 
needs for correct politeia, whether communal polity or, more importantly, 
personal way of life (the main Byzantine understanding of the term 
politeia). 
 
The association of rhetoric with ‘politics’ and its consequent inclusion in the 
philosopher’s identity are notions that Psellos was all too happy to adopt. 
He too, after all, imagined Christian writers as both ideal rhetors as well as 
ideal philosophers; and he too insisted on the reintegration of political 
praxis in the philosopher’s discourse.57 Indeed, one might say that, to some 
extent, Psellos’ self-representation embodies the philosophico-rhetorical 
qualities ascribed to rhetors of the past by contemporary rhetorical manuals, 
such as Sikeliotes’ Commentary. 
Yet, just as when compared with Synesius’ autobiography so also when 
juxtaposed with contemporary rhetorical theory, Psellos’ version of the 
philosopher-rhetor is markedly different in one seminal respect. While both 
Synesius and Sikeliotes emphasize the philosopher’s moral responsibility, 
disguised as civic responsibility, so as to justify the practice of rhetoric and 
involvement in political matters, this is a responsibility that does not figure 
prominently in Psellos’ self-representation. This does not mean that Psellos 
is some kind of an amoralist, either in theory or in practice—indeed, in the 
context of teaching or the writing of history, for instance, Psellos has much 
to say about virtues, and, following the Neoplatonic structuring and termi-
nology of virtues, ‘political’ (πολιτικαί) virtues at that.58 In self-represen-
tational writing, however, Psellos refrains from regarding his rhetoric and 
consequent politics as imparting or contributing to good morals. Instead, 
Psellos places at the foreground a view that is either morally indifferent or, 
at the very least, ambiguous. In the stead of morality, Psellos projects theat-
                                                
57 See Poem 7.177–78 or Theol. I 102.4–6 (on Gregory of Nazianzus). On Psellos and 
politics, see the next footnote. 
58 This is nicely elaborated in Dominic O’Meara’s essay in this volume. 
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rics and erotics, those, as we have seen, inferior aspects of public, ‘vulgar’ 
rhetoric, by portraying the political sphere as a theatrical arena, where the 
philosopher’s superior rhetorical performance incites irresistible desire. 
The speeches by which Psellos, at different stages of his career, defended 
the philosophical value of his involvement in Constantinopolitan public af-
fairs and the acquisition of imperial titles and honours, might suffice to 
show his approach. In these texts, the philosopher’s moral role—Christian 
or otherwise—is nearly never evoked in support of Psellos’ politics. Rather, 
the most prominent idea is that he follows the example of such (as Psellos 
regards them) politically active philosophers as Plato and Aristotle and, in-
deed, that he supersedes them by mixing their philosophy with Demosthenic 
rhetoric. The metaphor that gradually dominates Psellos’ argumentation is 
that of politics as a competitive stage (theatre, stadium or battlefield) in 
which he, again ‘by his nature’, excels. 
Here are the speeches in sequence: In To Those Who Think that the 
Philosopher Desires to Be Involved in Political Affairs, and because of This 
Disparage Him (Or. min. 6), Psellos claims that he is a philosopher who still 
remains in the human theatron, as a knowledgeable, observing spectator. In 
To the Slanderer Who Dropped [sc. against Psellos] a Defaming Leaflet (Or. 
min. 7), Psellos juxtaposes his discursive ‘performative’ ability (µιµού-
µενος) to an accuser who has entered the political ‘stage’. Against his oppo-
nent’s second-rate imitation of Aristophanic ‘drama’, Psellos sets his own 
model, Plato, ‘who performs [ὑποδύεται] Socrates’. In When He Resigned 
from the Title of Protoasekretis (Or. min. 8), Psellos likens himself to 
‘dancers’ and glorifies his ability to mix philosophy and rhetoric and thus 
assume a variety of forms (184–210). In To Those Who Begrudge Him the 
Honorary Title of Hypertimos (Or. min. 9), Psellos ridicules the inability of 
his opponents to compete with him. At the end of the ‘contest’ and as the 
theatron is still present, Psellos is appointed by the judge as the leader. 
Finally, in To Those Who Begrudge Him (Or. min. 10), Psellos proclaims 
that ‘he becomes an actor of another’s form’ leaving his opponents at a loss, 
for all they can do is remain spectators of his performance: ‘If you choose to 
run again and again in competition with me, and then you lose,’ Psellos 
concludes, ‘you will become—rather than competitors—spectators, sitting 
somewhere high on the theatron, watching my race.’59 
When involved in politics, Psellos the philosopher-rhetor is thus not an 
agent of morality but simply an inimitable performer, an ingenious actor. 
                                                
59 Or. min. 10.103–7: συντρέχειν πολλάκις αἱρούµενοι καὶ ἡττώµενοι ἄνω που τοῦ θεά-
τρου καθήµενοι θεαταὶ τοῦ ἐµοῦ δρόµου ἢ ἀνταγωνισταί µοι γενήσεσθε. 
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Indeed, civic morality is further set aside as Psellos recurrently refers to the 
incitement of private desires provoked by his performance. The intricate 
narrative of the Chronographia with which I began is instructive in this 
respect. After having narrated the curriculum of his intellectual formation, 
Psellos claims that his rhetorical achievement causes an intense and 
eroticized reaction on the part of the emperor: ‘Just like those possessed by 
the divine are inspired in a manner that cannot be communicated to others, 
he too could find no cause for his pleasure and would almost kiss me. This 
is the extent to which he was immediately entranced by my eloquence.’60 It 
seems that ἔρως, the desire that a good performer arouses, and thus the 
patronage and support he raises, rather than political ἤθος, is the intended 
rhetorical effect of the philosopher’s involvement in politics, in the 
philosopher’s aspiration to climb up the social ladder.61 
 
Rhetoric and philosophy after Psellos 
Despite Psellos’ self-projected confidence, the actual social fate of the 
Byzantine intellectual did not change radically, either for himself or for the 
generations of philosophers and rhetors that succeeded him in late eleventh- 
and twelfth-century Constantinople.62 Nevertheless, Psellos’ valuation of 
rhetoric marks a significant transition for the conception of rhetoric as this is 
evident in several twelfth-century writers, especially those associated with 
Anna Komnene in the second quarter of the twelfth century and those that 
followed Eustathios of Thessalonike toward the end of that same century.63 
For these writers, Psellos’ insistence on the mixture of philosophy with 
rhetoric becomes a topos.64 The renewed interest in Aristotle’s Rhetoric also 
                                                
60 Chron. VI 46: ὁ δὲ, ὥσπερ οἱ θεοφορούµενοι ἀδήλως τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐνθουσιῶσιν, οὕτω 
δὴ κἀκείνῳ αἰτίαν οὐκ εἶχεν ἡ ἡδονὴ, καὶ µικροῦ µε δεῖν κατεφίλησεν, οὕτω µου τῆς 
γλώττης εὐθὺς ἀπῃώρητο. 
61 See further e.g. Chron. VI 161 or Letters 6 and 69 (ed. Sathas 1876). 
62 See Magdalino (1993: 316–412).  
63 For Psellos’ influence on twelfth-century writers, see Papaioannou (forthcoming) with 
further bibliography. 
64 See Anna Komnene, Alexias 15.7.9.24–26; Michael Italikos, Orat. 15 (150.11) and Letter 
5 with Criscuolo (1971: 60–62; 69); Nikephoros Basilakes, Or. B1.19 (18.14–18) and B4.5 
(78.10–17); Eumathios Makrembolites, The Story of Hysmine and Hysminias 7.14; 
Theodore Prodromos, Monody for the Holiest Metropolitan of Trebizond kyr Stephanos 
Skylitzes 36 and 54–55 in Petit (1903); Niketas Eugeneianos, Funeral Oration on Theodore 
Prodromos, 456.6–11 in Petit (1902); John Tzetzes, Letter 77; Gregory Antiochos, Funeral 
Oration on Nicholas Kataphloron 58.23–59.5, ed. Sideras (1990); and Michael Choniates, 
Discourse to the Patriarch Michael 80.2–28 with Kolovou (1999: 266–70). See also 
Wilson (1983: 171), on the scribe Ioannikios and his self-representation. 
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belongs to this post-Psellian world where intellectuals search for further phi-
losophical justification of their pursuit of discursive performance.65 Indeed, 
for the first time in Byzantine history, it seems as if, equally to and, 
sometimes, regardless of philosophy, rhetoric by itself is considered capable 
of promising some kind of social authority.  
Two telling examples will suffice. The first is from Michael Italikos (c. 
1090?–before 1157), an author well versed in both rhetoric and philosophy. 
Italikos begins one of his letters to an unknown addressee (Letter 13) by 
claiming that ‘after comparing science against science, I find philosophy 
quite lacking in comparison to rhetoric’; and, following a lengthy compari-
son of the two ἐπιστῆµαι (with an emphasis on rhetoric’s ‘political/civic’ 
function), Italikos concludes: ‘compared with philosophy, rhetoric appears 
to me more heavenly’.66 Some fifty years later, in another rhetor, Euthymios 
Tornikes (late 12th–early 13th c.), we encounter one of the most extravagant 
encomia of rhetoric in middle Byzantine writing. In his Encomium to 
Alexios III Komnenos [1195–1203] … Urging the Emperor to Make Him a 
Rhetor, Tornikes, citing Synesius, writes: ‘In this way, this, the most beauti-
ful and most public [πάνδηµος] rhetoric benefits us in every respect … by 
immortalizing good emperors and by preserving up to the present day its 
familiar and dear name, the sophists.’67 
It would be a mistake to read Italikos’ and Tornikes’ words as empty 
wordiness, excessive remarks necessitated simply by occasion and genre, 
                                                
65 See John Italos, Rhetorical Method, ed. Kečakmadze (1966: 35–42) (on which cf. Conley 
2004 who downplays, too strongly in my view, the revival of Aristotle’s views on rhetoric 
in Italos), and the two commentaries, one anonymous (12th cent.?) and the other by 
Stephanos Skylitzes (12th cent., first half), both edited in Rabe (1896); for Skylitzes see 
also Hörandner (2007). Comparable are also the intricate views on (as well as practice of) 
rhetoric and philosophy by Theodore Metochites as excellently analysed in Bydén (2002). 
66 Ἐπιστήµην πρὸς ἐπιστήµην ἀντεξετάζων, εὑρίσκω φιλοσοφίαν παρὰ πολὺ λειπο-
µένην ῥητορικῆς … συγκρινοµένη ῥητορικὴ θεσπεσιωτέρα φιλοσοφίας µοι καταφαί-
νεται. For Italikos, cf. Papaioannou (2007). 
67 Darrouzès (1968, sect. 2, 140.30–31): Οὕτως ἡ καλλίστη καὶ π ά ν δ η µ ο ς  αὕτη 
ῥητορικὴ πανταχόθεν ἡµῖν ἐπιχορηγεῖ τὰ καλά, τοὺς … ἀγαθοὺς αὐτοκράτορας 
ἀπαθανατίζουσα καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον ταύτῃ καὶ φίλον ὄνοµα µέχρι δὴ καὶ ἐς δεῦρο, τοὺς 
σοφιστάς, περισῴζουσα. Cf. Synesius, Epist. 1 (cited also above): Παῖδας ἐγὼ λόγους 
ἐγεννησάµην, τοὺς µὲν ἀπὸ τῆς σεµνοτάτης φιλοσοφίας καὶ τῆς συννάου ταύτῃ ποιη-
τικῆς, τοὺς δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς πανδήµου ῥητορικῆς. See also section 1 in Tornikes’ speech 
(139.1–2): Ὢ καλὸν τοῦτο πάλαι κρατῆσαν ἔθος, ἀγωνίσµατα καὶ λ ό γ ο υ ς  τ ῆ ς  
π ρ έ σ β α ς  κ α ὶ  π α ν δ ή µ ο υ  τ α ύ τ η ς  ῥ η τ ο ρ ι κ ῆ ς  µέσοις ἀνακτόροις 
ἐνσοφιστεύεσθαι … ἄνδρα τρόφιµον τοῖς τῆς ῥητορικῆς ὅλοις τετελεσµένον ὀργίοις 
καὶ <τοῖς> τῆς συννάου δὲ σοφίας, ποιητικῆς τε καὶ γραµµατικῆς. The phrase appears 
also earlier, in the circle of Anna Komnene, in George Tornikes’ (between 1110 and 1120, 
died 1156/7) Prooimion for When He Became Teacher of the Psalter, ed. Darrouzès (1970: 
78.3–6). 
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letter-writing and speech of praise respectively. Rather, the remarkable 
value accorded to rhetoric suggests a social context where rhetoricians feel 
confident to invest in this value for their social advancement. Rhetoric is 
regarded as a valid profession and practice in which writers pride them-
selves and with which they praise their teachers, friends and associates.68 To 
value rhetoric in this way was not a self-evident matter nor simply an 
‘ideologically safe’ choice,69 but rather a remarkable novelty.  
 
The same point may be made also from a different perspective. The reader 
of twelfth-century writing will find also here affirmations of the value of 
philosophy over and above rhetoric. Nevertheless, even some of these more 
traditional views are expressed either within discussions focused on rhetoric 
or in genres conditioned by rhetoric. For instance, in Stephanos Skylitzes’ 
commentary on Aristotle’s Rhetoric we encounter the idea that rhetoric is 
subordinate to philosophy (ed. Rabe 1896: 268.27–28). This opinion, how-
ever, is expressed in a context where a philosophical justification of rhetoric 
is at work. Take also Timarion, with its ridiculing of the philosophical 
aspirations of rhetors like Psellos. One should not forget that the text itself is 
a fictional dialogue, in the tradition of playful Lucianic rhetoric, the kind of 
rhetoric which only now, after a silence of several centuries, is possible 
again in Byzantium in the context of the highly rhetorical twelfth-century 
culture.70 
Comparable is the situation in another text, with which I would like to 
conclude. Manuel Karantenos, a minor late twelfth-century intellectual, ad-
                                                
68 E.g., Italikos’ Letter 24 is addressed to a ‘rhetor’ while Italikos himself claims to be an 
accomplished ‘rhetor’ and ‘sophist’; Letter 14: 144.10–11. In his Monody, mentioned 
above (ed. Petit 1903), for his teacher and friend Stephanos Skylitzes (metropolitan of 
Trebizond at the moment of his death and likely the author of one of the two surviving 
Byzantine commentaries on Aristotle’s Rhetoric), Theodore Prodromos recurrently 
commends Skylitzes for his rhetorical eloquence while spending no word on the likely 
philosophia of his metropolitan friend. Similarly, in his Funeral Oration on Theodore 
Prodromos, also mentioned above, Niketas Eugeneianos dwells on the rhetorical (rather 
than philosophical) virtues of his friend, whom he, nevertheless, addresses as ‘philosopher’; 
Petit (1902: 463.3–4). Cf. also Constantine Manasses, Discourse to Michael Hagiotheo-
dorites 400–401, ed. Horna (1906). In the same vein, Eustathios of Thessalonike spends 
much time on (his) rhetoric while no single word on philosophia as a tool for self-
promotion in his Letters, ed. Kolovou (2006). 
69 Cf. Magdalino (1993: 335) on rhetoric as an ‘ideologically safe’ choice. 
70 Cf. the apophthegmatic definition of philosophia by John Tzetzes where philosophy is 
opposed to highly rhetorical discourse, yet within a poem explicating words and phrases 
from Tzetzes’ letters—both letter-writing and verse being exactly rhetorical enterprises; see 
Chil. 10.590 with Bydén (2003: 5). For the revival of fiction in this period see Mullett 
(2007) and Agapitos (2012). 
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dressed, in a brief essay, a student’s question on ‘the difference between 
mystical and superior philosophy and that lowly and vulgar [πάνδηµος] 
rhetoric’.71 Karantenos asks his student to use his imagination, his κατα-
ληπτικὴ φαντασία, and envision both disciplines personified before his 
eyes. An elaborate description follows, reminiscent of Lucian’s Dream:72 
the ‘immovable and divine’ female philosophy with her ‘masculine gaze’ is 
contrasted sharply with the ‘effeminate’ young male that is rhetoric. The 
conclusion is obvious: the student must embrace philosophy and avoid 
rhetoric lest he lose ‘the nobility of his soul’. This fear is an old one and 
Karantenos is in good company, as we saw above, to rekindle it.73 Neverthe-
less, that Karantenos employs a fanciful, imaginative, Lucianic rhetoric in 
order to make his ‘philosophical’ point gives testimony to the value rhetoric 
had, since Psellos, acquired in the rhetorico-philosophical debate. 
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